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APPENDIX C 
[Richard Stith, a Research (non-teaching) Professor of Law, is a board member of 
Consistent Life Network (www.consistent-life.org), where this article was published on 
Sept. 7, 2016. It is reprinted with Professor Stith’s permission.] 
When Choice Itself Hurts the Quality of Life 
Richard Stith 
Here’s a question about “choice” and abortion, assisted suicide, and voluntary 
euthanasia: Could the very existence of these options have a negative impact on 
the legally-authorized choosers, no matter what they choose? 
Consider that women who refuse legal abortion may be blamed for their choice 
by boyfriends, families, employers, and others. Infirm or dying people may find 
family and other caregivers upset by their refusal to agree to assisted suicide, if it’s 
available as a legal option. 
These are the sorts of overlooked consequences of choice that this blog is about. 
Society sometimes limits choice that’s harmful to the chooser. For example, we 
might not permit people to sell their organs because they might seriously harm 
themselves by preferring money to health. 
But there’s a second kind of harm that could befall voluntary organ sellers, not 
from what they choose but from their having been able to choose in the first place. 
Simply because they had a choice, they may lose support among friends, family, 
and employers. 
Compare the plight of someone who needs expensive and time-consuming 
special care because of an operation forced on her by an illness—say, cancer 
surgery—with a person having the same health needs resulting from her free and 
deliberate choice (not extreme economic necessity) to excise and sell part of her 
body. Cheerfully-given help for the post-surgery care of the voluntary seller will 
be less forthcoming, for her sad situation will be said to be her own fault. 
This is separate from any evaluation of which choices are good and which are 
bad. If the sale of one’s organs were legal, someone who refused to sell them could 
also be blamed for her own voluntary impoverishment. (“Don’t ask me for a loan. 
You could have a lot more money if you wouldn’t insist on keeping both your 
kidneys!”) She incurs this blame simply because of having a choice. If organ sale 
had remained illegal, others would have been more sympathetic to her economic 
needs. 
Even if she made a wise choice in not selling a kidney, her having a choice to 
sell or not to sell may make some people less sympathetic to her financial plight. 
This has nothing to do with the paternalistic notion that society should intervene to 
save people from making unwise choices. Here we (society, the law) cause her 
harm simply by leaving this choice open. She may be blamed by some no matter 
what she does. 
Care for the most vulnerable among us, those at the beginning of life and those 
who may be nearing the end of life, requires solidarity. Truly single parenting is 
nearly impossible; the help of others is needed to bear and raise a child, and 
solidarity 
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with the child is needed as well. Likewise, the afflictions of age and illness are 
often too much to bear without family or friends standing in solidarity. 
Yet autonomous choices are now being proposed for human life in its initial and 
final stages. Those choices concern the existence of life itself: “Should I choose 
abortion or birth?” and “Should I choose assisted suicide?” 
But the ability to choose—to undergo or to refuse abortion or suicide—may 
isolate the chooser. It may leave her without the solidarity she needs to implement 
her choices. That undercuts real autonomy. 
Throughout human history, children have been known to be the consequence of 
sexual relations between men and women. Both sexes knew they were equally 
responsible for their children. Contraception didn’t change this; it makes 
fertilization and birth less likely, but mother and father are still equally responsible 
if fertilization and birth nevertheless occur. 
Elective abortion changes everything. Abortion absolutely prevents the birth of 
a child. A woman’s free choice for or against abortion breaks the causal link 
between conception and birth. It matters little what or who caused conception. It 
matters little that the man involved may have insisted on having unprotected 
intercourse when the woman didn’t want it. It is she and she alone who finally 
decides whether the child is to be born. 
A grandmother’s “right” to assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia means that 
she has been given a way out. So her suffering seems no longer to call for as much 
family compassion or social support. In choosing to continue living in great 
dependency, a grandmother may be felt to be deeply selfish, preferring to benefit 
herself at a heavy cost to her family. 
Similarly, social policy planners may reason that the option of voluntary death 
diminishes any public duty to regulate toxic industries, or to secure health 
insurance benefits, to decrease the risk of suffering. Even if governmental acts or 
omissions cause suffering, it may be thought, no duty of solidarity arises where the 
victim has refused an accessible option of suicide. 
Here’s another question: can a life chosen as an option ever have the dignity of 
a life simply accepted? Does a child a mother once chose not to abort suffer from 
her having been able to choose otherwise? Does the severely disabled but suicide-
rejecting person suffer from having an existence that needs to be justified? Does 
making choice possible bring a profound change to our perception of the life that 
is made optional? 
Choosing to let a being live confirms a radical domination over that being, like 
the upraised thumb of a Roman emperor in the Coliseum—when thumbs-down was 
always possible. 
That makes the chooser—and others—less likely to respect the object of choice. 
Even if someone ends up being evaluated so highly that one would never choose 
her death, when an evaluation was required rather than the person simply being 
accepted for who she is, something very valuable has been lost. 
